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Risks and requirements in the 
Electronic World1
Classical versus Electronic World  I
Classical world Electronic world
? Traditional players
? Bank controlled networks ? Networks not controlled by banks
? New players (e.g. MSPs)
? Physical presence of 
cardholder
? physical authentication 
characteristics of the card
? comparison of
signature
? two card 
technologies
? Unprotected transmission of data
? payment and personal details
? physical characteristics of card can 
no longer be used
Classical versus Electronic World II
Classical world Electronic world
? Physical presence of 
merchant
? physical presence at store of 
goods that can be seen and 
touched
? delivery of goods against 
payment
? Lack of human involvement
? more transactions
? more quickly and more cheaply
? Large scale
? in virtual world
? in other environments (cross-
contamination)? Small scale
Cardholder risks
? Fraud scenarios  
– Sites are created, collect payment data, and then disappear 
after fraudulently charging cardholders
– Insecure (insufficiently protected) merchant servers
? Main risks
– Transactions with fraudulent merchants
– Debits for non-agreed service subscriptions
– Transaction details stolen and re-used for another purpose 
(including cross-contamination)
– Privacy violated
Merchant risks
? Fraud risks  
– Transactions with cardholders using stolen payment 
data, repudiated subsequently by legitimate owners
– Cardholders falsely deny having ordered particular 
goods
– Loss of confidentiality of transaction or consumer 
details
? Business risks
– Investment in solutions that do not bring the 
expected revenue
Issuer and Acquirer risks
? Common risk
– Increase in charge-backs and associated costs, in particular 
due to cardholder non-authorized transactions
? Additional risks for issuer
– Cardholders not confident in payments in the Virtual World
– Cardholder preference for other e- or m-payment security 
techniques
– Merchants wait for implementation
of security techniques
Formulating requirements
? Security requirements  
– Including confidentiality and integrity, merchant and 
cardholder authentication, and replay protection.
? Business or personal requirements
– Including absence of liability in case of fraud, 
reduced charge-backs, etc.
? Operational requirements  
– Including ease of use/implementation, 
interoperability, device independence, etc.
2Security Techniques for e-Payment
Liability shift
? From security considerations  
– Balance between added security and 
implementation cost/complexity
? From business and operational 
considerations
– Merchant side of business no longer bears costs of 
fraudulent transactions
– Issuers responsible for fraudulent transactions
Security versus Complexity
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Early solution – analysis
? Security considerations  
– Absence of confidentiality, integrity, entity 
authentication, replay protection
– Cardholder reluctance to provide card numbers
? Operational considerations
– Ease of use and of implementation
Necessity to create new security techniques to 
manage the specific risks of payments in the 
electronic world
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Secure Socket Layer (SSL) – analysis
? Security considerations
? Protection of card details from hackers during transmission, 
using e.g. 128-bit algorithms
? Lack of protection of merchant databases from hackers
? Poor merchant identification and absence
of cardholder authentication
? Attacks based on cardholder ignorance
? Operational considerations
? Ease of use and implementation
Virtual Card Numbers
? Description
? Static card numbers guaranteed for online purchases
– used as stand-alone program
– integrated into existing solutions (e.g. SSL)
? Analysis
? Prevention of cross-contamination
? No added complexity for cardholder
? No change on existing merchant infrastructure but high impact on
issuer infrastructure
? Restricted Primary Account Number (PAN) space
? Hackers still able to conduct fraudulent Internet transactions
Pseudo Card Numbers
? Description
? Dynamic card numbers guaranteed for online purchases
– expire quickly, depending on various criteria (transaction value, number of 
transactions, lifetime, etc.)
? Obtaining such numbers requires cardholder authentication
? Analysis
? Additional flexibility for cardholder but (low) added complexity
? No change in existing merchant infrastructure but high impact on issuer 
infrastructure
? Restricted Primary Account Number (PAN) space
? Liability shift applies
Secure Electronic Transaction (SET)
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SET – analysis
? Security considerations
? Very secure: confidentiality and integrity, merchant and 
cardholder authentication, replay protection
? Business considerations
? Guarantee of payment for merchants, reduced charge-backs
? Operational considerations
? Distribution of certificates and portability
? Complexity of use and of implementation
? No device independence
3D-SET – description
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3D-SET – analysis
? Main changes to SET
? Reliance on cardholder authentication online to the issuer 
(issuer-defined method)
? Certificates still used but held at server wallets
? Standardized payment messages required between issuer and 
acquirer domains
3-D SET improvements were not sufficient to drive 
significant financial institution investment – SET is 
now undergoing a decommissioning process within 
SETCo
3-D Secure – background
? Currently being deployed by both MasterCard 
and Visa.
? Was initially a Visa design but has now also 
been adopted by MasterCard.
? Supports cardholder authentication.
? Main incentive to merchant is liability transfer.
3-D Secure – technical approach
? Builds on existing ‘tried and trusted’
technology, including SSL/TLS.
? Minimises changes to current payment model.
? Based on negative experience with SET and 
3D-SET.
3-D Secure – key players
? Merchant:
– installs plug-in on server to talk to central 3-D Secure directory.
? Issuer provides Access Control Server (ACS) to:
– authenticate cardholder;
– generate and sign Account Authentication Value (AAV);
– verify AAV as part of clearing process.
? Cardholder:
– authenticates to issuer.
? Acquirer:
– provides payment authorisation as at present (also verify AAV). 
? Brand:
– provides online directory server.
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3-D Secure – analysis
? Security considerations  
– Confidentiality and integrity linked to SSL security
– Issuer-defined authentication method
– Digital signature and Accountholder Authentication Value 
(AAV) as proof of cardholder authentication
? Business considerations
– Guarantee of payment for merchants, reduced charge-backs
? Operational considerations
– Ease of use: cardholders only need a browser to participate
– Large number of messages sent to conduct a transaction
3-D Secure – cardholder authentication
? Cardholder authentication mechanisms  
– Chosen by Issuers
– Prove knowledge or possession of authentication factor(s)
? Something you know, something you have, something you are, 
something you do
– Security evaluation
? Number of factors involved, intrinsic security of factors, security 
properties of underlying mechanisms
? Need for personal, pervasive factors
– Mobile devices, e.g. mobile phones may be a suitable solution
3-D Secure – cardholder authentication risks
? The scheme uses http redirection to redirect 
cardholder web browser from merchant server 
to Issuer ACS.
? This could be subverted to allow man-in-the-
middle attack, where cardholder browser 
directed to ‘mock’ Issuer ACS.
? This could allow theft of cardholder password.
? Hence ‘static’ cardholder authentication not 
desirable.
3-D Secure – using EMV cards
? One way of allowing dynamic cardholder 
authentication at minimum issuer cost is to 
leverage EMV cards (existing secure token).
? MasterCard have deployed scheme where 
cardholders are issued with low cost personal 
card reader, and EMV card used to generate a 
one-time authenticator for Issuer ACS.
Future of Internet payment security
? 3-D Secure addresses some of security issues 
but not all.
? Merchant servers not protected, and there is 
no authentication of merchant to cardholder.
? Is this a long term problem?
3Mobile Payments
Use of Mobile Devices
? As authentication devices
? Mobile (or rather SIM card) as authentication factor
? Mobile supporting an authentication mechanism
– Mobile as PIN entry device
? As access devices to support the whole payment phase
? Mobile devices have scarce resources
• This may preclude the implementation of some solutions
? The user interface is limited
• Impractical user interfaces may create new threats and make data
entry difficult
Characteristics
? Personal nature
– Suitable for performing security functions (e.g. PIN entry) as 
less sensitive to tampering, keyboard sniffing, etc.
? Pervasive nature
– May solve cost and distribution issues associated with massive 
rollout of tokens or specific hardware
? Specific channels and protocols
– Particularities of channel (e.g. over-the-air link) and of 
protocols must be considered
– Rapidly changing wireless standards
Two models
? Acquirer-centric model
– Merchant in charge of handling the interactions with the mobile 
device
– Usually relies on a mobile-specific protocol
– Examples include dual chip and dual slot
? Issuer-centric model
– Issuer in charge of handling the interactions with the mobile 
device
– Merchant may be unaware of mobile nature of payment
– Usually relies on a classical e-Payment protocol
– Examples: mobile phone callback, WIM-based signature
Positioning of m-Payment Schemes
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Complexity
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Full support of the 
payment protocol by 
IP-capable device
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protocol messages by 
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Redirection of 
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external routing 
service
Redirection of SMS 
messages
WIM Signature with 
SMS
Dual slot EMV 
application with STK 
and SMS
Current shortcomings
? Authentication
– Reliance on personal nature of mobile device
– Reliance on authentication by Telco, or need for additional 
mechanisms
? Confidentiality and data integrity
– Reliance on the underlying mobile network security
– No end-to-end security services
? Non-repudiation
– Need for additional mechanisms, not widely deployed or not 
fully suitable
Mobile Payment Security Techniques  I
? 2-way messaging
– PIN-based authentication
– Define a common message flow using SMS messages
– Define ‘Security Best Practices’
? Proprietary systems
– Implementations rely on the use of SIM toolkit (STK)
– STK applications may embed symmetric keys or have public 
key cryptographic functionalities
– Requires co-operation with mobile operator(s)
Mobile Payment Security Techniques  II
? WAP
– Standardized and implemented on most phones
– WAP offers security services (WTLS and 
application-level cryptographic library) but they rely 
on the use of a WIM
– WIM stores key for WTLS authentication & key for 
signature of data
– WIM functionalities often combined with SIM 
functions
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